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THE OMBUDSMAN IN THE COMMON LAW SYSTEMADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
WALTER

W

ToxEY*

The objective of this brief enquiry is a response to the observation

of Friedrich von Hayek that the threats that grow in relation to the
rule of law, which is equated with the due process of law, will not be
eliminated by importng the rules and forms of judicial procedure into
places where they do not belong. "To use the trappings of judicial form
where the essential conditions for a judicial decision are absent, or to
give judges power to decide issues which cannot be decided by the
application of [judicial] rules, can have no effect but to destroy the
respect for them even where they deserve it." 1
With regard to supervision or regulation of admimstrative decisionmaking in common law countries, there has been only marginal application of judicial rules of due process, and court enquiry has been madequate even in this restricted context. While there is no panacea for all
administrative difficulties, it is submitted that the office of Ombudsman,
or legislative commissioner, based on the original Swedish model2 with
broad jurisdiction and sanctions might be a means of providing a higher
caliber of justice in the bureaucratic state.
The expansion of bureaucracy has long been delineated and schematized. Max Weber noted the required ingredients as capitalism, mdustrialization, urbanization, and technological advancement- developing
concurrently. In addition to its proliferation into more and more activities, bureaucracy constantly tends to be oligarchic in structure. In
the first place, its exercise of control is based on disciplined knowledge
*LL.B., Ph.D., Umversity of Texas. Besides being a member of the faculty of
Louisiana State Umversity an New Orleans, Professor Toxey is research Coordinator
for the Louisiana State Law Institute.
1. F HAYEK, THE CoNsnToTI
oF LniETY 219 (1960).
2. REGEiUNGSFORMEN (The Constitution Act) (Sweden, 1809) provided for the appointment of two parliamentary officials, the Justieombudsmannen (JO) and the
Militieombudsmannen (MO), to supervise the civil and military administration on behalf
of the Riksdag. As elaborated by legislation, their duties included receiving and investigating complaints of prvate citizens concerning alleged unfair performance of
official duties.
3. M. WE .R, THE ThEORY OF SOCIAL Am EcoNoic OR.ANIZATIO

son & T. Parsons transl. 1947).
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or expertise. Expert training places a barrier between the bureaucrat and
the citizen, with the experts having special "secrets" of their trade which
no citizen can master unless he is incorporated within the system. Secondly, fixed jurisdictions ordered by rules produce a compartmentalization antithetical to lay participation. One result of such compartmentalization is a special vocabulary with particular meanings to the
bureaucrats. An additional increase in symbolic distance between official
and citizen is produced by a firmly established system of superiority and
subordination. The growth of the situation produces a 'bureaucratic
profession with its own interests. Finally, the use of written official
records produces a complex system of filing cabinets, often locked, containing records accessible primarily to only select employees.
Numerous problems have developed in the democratic state as bureaucratization progresses: among the more difficult are problems involiing
the lack of accountability of bureaucrats to their constituents, to regular
legislative procedures, and to traditional democratic precepts. Ancillary
to the question of delegated legislation is that of administrative adjudication. Very often, in fact, the same factors that make it. desirable to
delegate legislative authority, i.e., the technical nature of the subject and
the need for speed, justify the creation of administrative adjudication
machinery to decide disputes over the matters concerned. The machinery provided is generally a tribunal for determining cases of alleged
abuse or disuse of executive power. The incipient pro blem lies in the
fact that questions between individuals and the administration are adjudicated by the administrative agency itself. This problem of concentration of power is compounded in a system like ours which emphasizes
separation of powers. The major objections to the'administrative tribunal
are urged on the one hand by opponents to increased executive power
and on the other, by those who are concerned with the appearance of
justice. This latter argument follows the reasoning that no matter how
fair the system may be in fact, it gives the appearance of injustice by
violating the tenet that the judge of an issue in controversy should have
no personal involvement in it. Slightly more than a decade ago the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries, commonly called the
Franks Committee, summed up the situation in the United Kingdom as
follows:
Reflection on the general and economic changes of recent decades
convinces us that administrative tribunals as a system of adjudication have come to stay. The tendency for issues arising from legis-
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lative schemes to be referred to special tribunals is likely to grow
4
rather than to diminish.
With regard to government-administered programs, an astute legal
scholar has observed that administrators and judges alike have until recently viewed such activities as privileges granted or prerogatives exercised by the sovereign rather than actions in which individual rights are
involved."
The last several decades, however, have witnessed an expansion of
individual rights. Justice Frankfurter attributed the raising of society's
standards of decency to our reaching a "certain stage of civilization." 8
With regard to benefactory statutes, for example, a legislature may narrow or repeal a previously enacted benefit, and beneficiaries established
by a legislative act may have their interests reduced by subsequent legislation. Recently, however, the courts have increasingly spoken out against
legislative manipulation of benefactory statutes resulting in violation of
constitutional rights. In short, it has been obvious that denying a benefit
can deprive a citizen of his liberties as effectively as imposing penal
sanctions. 7 Another ramification of the greater awareness of personal
rights has been the change in attitude toward bureaucratic discretion.
In this regard judges have found conflict with the first amendment right
of free exercise of religion in an administrative disqualification of an
applicant for benefits on the ground that she objected to Saturday work
due to religious beliefs." In like manner, there has been elimination of
administrative conditions imposed on tenants in public housing facilities
if such conditions curtail constitutional rights. 9
A similar pattern of development is observed in review of administrative action. Traditionally the legislature announced that permission to
enquire into decisions of administrative officials, boards, or agencies was
a matter of legislative discretion to be granted or withheld as the legis4. REPORT OF THE
218, at 8 (1957).
5. W. GEu.,HOR,

COMMITTEE ON ADMINISRATIVE TRmuNALs AND ENQUIRES,

CMND.

INDVmu.AL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS, ch. 3 (1956).
This subject, originally explored in Professor Gellhorn's lectures in the Edward Douglas
White Lectures on Citizenship to the Louisiana State University Law School, is expanded in his book OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS (1966).
6. Setin v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
7. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). A license could not be conditioned on
waiver of privilege against self-incrimination.
8. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9. Holt v. Richmond Redev. & Housing Auth, 266 F. Supp. 397 (1966). In this case
the administrative conditions sought to curtail the tenant's rights of political expression.
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lature saw fit; the courts typically ratified this assertion with language
to the effect that there was no right of appeal in administrative matters.
Not only could the legislature announce with finality which questions
might be reviewed, but also which tribunals could hear a permitted
appeal and where review should stop.' 0 Consequently, if no statutory
procedure was defined, there was no review. An exception to this lack
of recourse was possible when the prerogative writs were applicable."
The use of these extraordinary writs as a method of review has been
highly complicated and usually unsatisfactory. Professor Davis has aptly
referred to the system as "[a]n imaginary system cunningly planned
for the evil purpose of thwarting justice and maximizing fruitless litigation [which] would copy the major features of the extraordinary
remedies." 12
Of the six traditional prerogative writs-procedendo, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus-the first and last
have virtually no relevance to administrative action. Procedendo, where
it is extant, concerns the relationship of superior to inferior court and
directs a judicial action. Habeas corpus is usually of significance in
criminal law when improper incarceration is at issue. Quo warranto,
which requires full explanation of the authority by which a person exercises an office or franchise, also has only minimal application. Therefore, for the purpose of judicial enquiry into administrative actions, the
remaining extraordinary writs have been of significance. Certiorari is a
writ from a court to a quasi-judicial body ordering it to send up a case
record in order that more sure and speedy justice may be secured or
that errors and irregularities may be corrected. Mandamus commands
a tribunal, corporation, or person to perform a clear public duty imposed by law. Finally, prohibition forbids or restrains an action by a
lower tribunal which usurps a jurisdiction with which it is not lawfully
vested.
These incomplete and overlapping procedures were utterly inadequate
as a system of judicial review. They were granted only in the discretion
of the court after it first determined that it had jurisdiction to take the
case. Besides this, the general rule was that the prerogative writs were
not applicable if there were adequate statutory procedures available.
10. Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., 182 Ind. 36, 105 N.E. 496 (1914).

11. This name was applied to certain judicial writs issued by the courts only upon
proper cause shown and never as a matter of right. The theory was that they involved
a direct interference by the government with the liberty and the property of the

citizen, and therefore were justified only as an exercise of prerogative of the Crown.
12. 3 K. DAvis, ADMnIsTRAIVE LAW § 24.01 (1958).
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Furthermore, the courts would not accept review if they interpreted the
statute to give agency decisions a preclusive effect. For example, the
New York courts, until the twentieth century, demonstrated a marked
deference to administrative judgment and incorporated this attitude into
a rule (shared by other state judiciaries) that mandamus would not lie
to review the exercise of judgment or discretion. 13 Shortly before the
First World War, however, it was increasingly recognized that the
logical extension of this restriction would permit administrative bodies
to operate without the control of law or even in disregard of law. The
New York Court of Appeals in 1912 enunciated a rule to provide some
legal oversight of administrative discretion:
In the absence of some express limitation the action of the commission in fixing such tests must stand, unless it is so clearly irrelevant and unreasonable as to be palpably indefensible and improper.
If any fair, reasonable argument may be made to sustain the action
the courts should not interfere, even though they may differ from
the commission as to its advisability.14
The substance of this "unreasonable-arbitrary" criterion has continued
to be the guiding rule. There has also been little distinction by the
courts between administrative discretion exercised in rule-making and
that exercised in adjudication.
Obviously it is a delicate affair for a court to conclude that an agency
acted arbitrarily or unreasonably notwithstanding the administrator's
assertion that all relevant factors have been weighed. The language of
the federal Administrative Procedure Act' 5 indicates several of the difficulties involved. Section 10(a) of the APA states in part:
Except so far as . . . . (2) agency action is by law committed to
agency discretion(a) Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within
the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.16

13. People ex rel. Wooster v. Maher, 141 N.Y. 330, 36 NE. 396 (1894), which construes Chap. 16 of the CODE OF CivLL PRocEDuRE (1880).
14. People ex rel. Moriarty v. Creelman, 206 N.Y. 570, 100 N.E. 446 (1912).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 1001 etseq. (1964).
16. Id. § 1009(9).
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On its face, this section appears to prohibit judicial review whenever
an issue is committed to.agency discretion. Section 10(e) of the same
law, however, provides that agency action may be set aside for "an abuse
of discretion," which implies reviewability. An interpretation that reconciles these two provisions is that once a question has been committed
to agency discretion, the only ground for reversal is an administrative
decision which is arbitrary or unreasonable. Clearly "abuse of discretion" must mean more than that the agency, after considering all
relevant aspects, reached a conclusion different from that which the
court would have reached. As indicated earlier, bureaucrats are delegated responsibility because of their expertise and their special ability
to carry out the legislative policy, but if the bureau were to exclude a
factor that the legislature intended to be considered, or included an
irrelevant factor, the delegated discretion would be abused. Another
possible abuse might occur where unreasonable weight is given to one
of the relevant factors. In any of these situations a court might void
the agency action as unreasonable. The balance is so delicate, however,
that the courts avoid striking down administrative acts unless they feel
17
that arbitrariness is clearly, present.
All of the countries of common law tradition demonstrate marked
limitation upon review of administrative action. Without any separate
administrative court hierarchy as in the French and German systems,
the English-law countries have typically established administrative tribunals with limited court review similar to the American arrangement.
New Zealand's legal and juridical structures demonstrate many parallels
to ours, and its experience with the Ombudsman provides a relevant precedent for American inquiry. Following publication of the Franks
Committee Report, mentioned above, parliamentary and judicial discussions concerning administrative justice were held within the Commonwealth, and New Zealand was the first member country to borrow
the Scandinavian institution by enacting the Parliamentary Commissioner
Act 1962.18

In New Zealand, as in the United States, the legislature finds itself
increasingly unable adequately to supervise administration. The regular
court systems of all common law countries are practically powerless
to entertain allegations of unreasonable delay, partiality, official rudeness,
or unexplained failures to act. Many complaints deal with matters for
17. Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
18. Law of Sept. 7, 1962, Statute No. 10 (N.Z.).
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which damages or other judicial remedies are not appropriate. At the
time this legislation was enacted, there was no requirement in New
Zealand law that administrative authorities afford a reasonable hearing,
adequate to the circumstances of the particular case, to citizens likely to
be adversely affected by administrative action. The regular courts in
this country have traditionally exercised a limited review over officials
possessing statutory powers. The scope of judicial review, however,
has been shaped largely by the nature of the remedies available to bring
administrative acts or omissions before the courts. Unfortunately, these
remedies (the prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari) have become so encrusted with historical limitations as to render
them only partially effective in dealing with modem problems. The
action for a declaration also has been available, but it has in practice
filled only a few of the gaps left by the prerogative writs. Broadly
speaking, therefore, it can be said that the supervision of the courts at
law has extended to insuring that administrators do not exceed their
statutory powers. These powers are exceeded when an official does
something for which there is no warrant in the statute, or in other words,
acts ultra vires. 19 A similar situation existed in the United Kingdom at
the time the British Ombudsman was established in 1967.20
The New Zealand statute provides for the formal executive, the
Governor-General, to appoint the Ombudsman on the recommendation
of the legislature, the unicameral House of Representatives, and sets
forth an extensive jurisdiction for the office. Practically all departments, boards, commissions, and authorities of the government come
within the purview of the Act, and the last section states that its provisions are in addition to any other remedy or right of appeal existing
in law. 1 A common ingredient of statutes which establish administrative tribunals in New Zealand is a privative clause stating on its face
that the tribunal's action is final. The nation's supreme court, however,
has consistently asserted the right to rule on questions of jurisdiction
based on the principle that privative clauses can be effective only if confined to decisions made by the tribunal acting within its jurisdiction.
Within the scope of his powers, the principal function of the Ombuds19. G. Omi, REPORT oN ADMiNsrRAr
JTsJrIcE IN NEW ZEALAND, pt. V (1964).
20. The Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, c. 13 which came into force April
1, 1967 does not use the word "Ombudsman." Neither the British nor the Hawaiian
Ombudsman (The Ombudsman Act of 1967, Act 306 Hawaii) has powers as extensive
as those of the New Zealand official.
21. The Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1962, 5 29 (N.Z.).

1969]

OMBUDSMAN IN THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM

man is investigation. He is empowered to investigate any decision or
recommendation made, or any act done or omitted (relating to a matter
of administration and affecting any person or body of persons in his or
its personal capacity) by any named government entity or by any
officer or employee in the exercise of any power or function conferred
on him by any law. Excluded from his authority, however, is the power
to investigate any decision or act for which there is a specific right to
apply for review to any court on the merits of the case. Also excluded
are decisions made by a minister of the Crown and matters of military
command.22 Other than in decisions involving deliberations of the
cabinet, national defense, diplomacy, and criminal investigation, administrative secrecy (encountered in the United States under the heading
"executive privilege") is largely penetrable by the Ombudsman. Investigation may be made either on a complaint by any person or on his own
initiative. In any case, investigation is discretionary, and he may direct
that even the nominal complaint fee be waived. Before investigating
any matter, the permanent head of the department or other government
organization must be informed. Although no person has any right to
be heard, an opportunity to present evidence must be given to an
affected agency when it appears that an adverse report is indicated.
The Ombudsman is authorized to examine on oath and to require the
production of documents and materials from any officer, employee, or
member of any government organization. Every such examination is
a judicial proceeding with regard to perjury and the privileges of witnesses. Subject to the exceptions referred to above, i.e., the areas of international relations, cabinet deliberations, etc., the rule of law which
authorizes the withholding of information on the ground that disclosure
would be injurious to the public interest does not apply in respect to
any proceedings before the Ombudsman. The Act goes on to provide
criminal sanctions for willful obstruction or deception or failure to comply with the Ombudsman's requirements in the exercise of his functions.
The ultimate goal of the Ombudsman's inquiry is exposure of maladministration. Section 19 of the New Zealand law provides for publicity
to be given after his investigation if he decides that any decision, recommendation, act, or omission:
(a) Appears to have been contrary to law; or
(b) Was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or improperly discrimina22. Id. § 11.
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tory or was in accordance with a rule of law or a provision of
any enactment or a practice that is or may be unreasonable,
unjust, oppressive, or improperly discriminatory; or
(c) Was based wholly or pardy on a mistake of law or fact; or
(d) Was wrong. 28
The provisions of this section also apply when the Ombudsman is of the
opinion that in the making of a decision or in the commission or omission
of an act an administrator's discretionary power has been exercised for
an improper purpose or that reasons should have been given for the
decision.
In any of the foregoing situations the Ombudsman must report his
reasoned opinion to the appropriate department or division together with
such recommendations as he thinks proper. Furthermore, he may request the administrative agency to notify him, within a specified time,
of the steps (if any) that it will utilize to give effect to his recommendations. He also must send a copy of his report and recommendations to
the minister concerned. The section finally provides that if, within a
reasonable time after the report is made, no administrative action is
taken which seems to the Ombudsman to be adequate, he may send a
copy of his report and recommendations to the prime minister. Thereafter, he may make such a report to the parliament on the matter as he
thinks appropriate under the circumstances. As an exception to the
ordinary rule that no one has a right to appear in a hearing before the
Ombudsman, it is specified that no comment that is adverse to any person shall be contained in any report under the Act unless the person
concerned has been given the opportunity to be heard.
Another section of the Act provides that the Ombudsman make an
annual report to Parliament of the exercise of his functions in general.
Subsequent legislative guidelines enacted by the House of Representatives direct that general reports relating to his office be published in the
public interest. 24 These published reports have been widely disseminated
by the New Zealand news media.-5 Consequently there has developed
a comprehensive public awareness of the existence of the Ombudsman,
the scope of his powers, and the individual's rights to make use of his
services.
23. Id. § 19.
24. House of Representatives, Ombudsman's Rules, 1962, as amended.
25. The regular feature From the Ombudsman's Casebook apearing in The New
Zealand Herald (Auckland) is typical of newspaper coverage in the nation's cities.

1969]

OMBUDSMAN IN THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM

The professional journals of the New Zealand legal profession also
carry regular reports of the Ombudsman's activities. The following is
an example of materials reported in "The Ombudsman, Cases of Interest
to the Legal -rofession," -a regular section of the New Zealand Law
Journal (condensed by the writer)The complaint involved the enforcement of fishing regulations
and the ambiguity of language used in a fishing license issued
by a local governing district. The dispute concerned whether
the license was for a short- or long-term period, and the complainant was charged with fishing without a proper license by
a Wild Life Officer of the national Department of Internal Affairs.
The case was not brought to a hearing until five months later at
which time the complainant was convicted in Magistrate's Court.
The Ombudsman's investigation indicated that the Departmental
prosecutor had been aware before the hearing that the particular
ambiguity in the wording of the license had been inquired into
and ruled incorrect by his Department. This information, however, had not been made available to the complainant or to the
Magistrate's Court. The conclusions reached by the Ombudsman
were that there had been unreasonable delay m bringing the case
to a hearing and that the prosecuting officer had acted in an irresponsible manner. Added to the conclusions was a recommendation
that officials who would be called to conduct prosecutions in the
course of their duties should receive traimng m the responsibility
of a person prosecuting on behalf of the Crown. As the problem
could well arise in other national departments, the case was also
brought to the attention of the State Services Commission (which
heads the national civil service) for the purpose of including the
recommendations in staff tramng programs in general. 2
In evaluating the data available regarding New Zealand's experience
with the Ombudsman, it is apparent that much of his work is in the
nature of bringing about citizen understanding of official actions in situations where there has been msufficient explanation of the considerations
underlying the decision.. In practice, only a very small percentage of
complaints have been found to be justified. In two recent years, for
example, slightly more than seven percent of complaints have resulted
in recommendations for umproved procedures.27 The institution thus
26. 21 N.ZL.J. 504 (1967).
27. Powrs, R PORT OF Trm OzAmuDsSN FOR T

YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH, 1966, at
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provides an impartial agency in which misunderstanding can be corrected. It is also beneficial to the administrator to have this device for
quashing unjustified allegations of maladministration.
There are several serious restrictions on the effectiveness of the New
Zealand Ombudsman. His competence does not extend to local authorities, nor to the courts. Nor has he jurisdiction whenever there is a right
of appeal to some administrative tribunal. He has no executive functions and is limited to making recommendations and reports. A recent
study of the New Zealand Ombudsman from an authority system perspective indicates considerable instability in his bases of influence. Professor Hill concludes that the personal attributes of the incumbent, economic fluctuations in the system, and changes in partisan tides are major
factors in the Ombudsman's authority. Despite the uncertainties inherent
in the existing arrangement, however, he notes that: "The knowledge
that an independent agent can review their every administrative action
has a definite prophylactic effect on officials' actions." 2
CONCLUSIONS

The inadequacies in administrative law of common law countries have
caused serious consideration of possible corrective measures. One widely
respected solution is that found in most civil law countries and typified
by the French Conseil d'Etat. This judicial institution includes an elaborate jurisprudence with separate procedural techniques and is especially
commendable in the area of government contracts. It has developed an
extensive set of safeguards balancing the interests of the individual and
those of the state, a set of principles which determine when it will intervene and overrule administrative actions. The proponents of such an
institution further argue that only an administrative supreme court can
achieve realistic control over the vast scope of activities of the modem
administrative state.
It is submitted, however, that the Swedish rather than the French
import is likely to be more assimilable to the common law system. In
the first place, the creation of a kind of Conseil d'Etat would seem almost certain to create elaborate and expensive procedural rules requiring
representation by counsel and extensive documentation techniques. Instead of complex litigation, the usual complaint requires a device charac4 (1966). The figures were 45 of 685 complaints in the year ending March 31, 1966 and
55 of 743 complaints in the previous year.
28. Hill, The New Zealand Ombudsman's Authority System, 20 PoL. Sci. 48-50 (1968).
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terized by simplicity and lack of expense. Informality is the hallmark
of the Ombudsman; the independent third party who has all necessary
powers of investigation and on the basis of whose findings the administrator can properly be asked to take action. Experience in other countries has indicated that a recommendation from an Ombudsman who
enjoys public confidence may be just as effective as an order of a court.2
An additional factor to be considered in the confrontation between the
individual citizen and bureaucracy is the auxiliary or supportive role of
the Ombudsman. His concurrence could well be a significant factor in
converting an isolated, insecure individual into a formidable opponent
or group of protestors. It should be remembered, however, that probably
most of the complaints that come before the Ombudsman will be found
to be unjustified after investigation.30 A resulting benefit is the provision
of not only a complaint channel for the citizen, but also a screen for the
conscientious bureaucrat against inaccurate criticism.
Implicit in the concept of the institutionalized third party investigator is an expansion of our constitutionalized personal rights. The area of
"non-visible decision-making" 31 would be reduced if a kind of administrative bill of rights were to be added to our system. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comnnittee vu. McGrat32 described administrative carelessness or bigotry
in apt language: "secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and selfrighteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness." Positive obligations with regard to contemporary requirements for establishing justice and promoting the general welfare need to be erected alongside the
prohibitions on government. But a broad gulf separates recognition of
the existence of rights and their successful assertion. Because litigation
remains as the ultimate implementor, judicial remedies, now so inadequate
and unwieldy, must also be modernized. For example, by expanding
and creating remedies uniform in all jurisdictions, the old prerogative
writ procedures would become more effective. In like manner, the
archaic areas of executive privilege and sovereign immunity should be
drawn to conform to contemporary facts of economic and political life.
In common law countries the whole field of government contract needs
drastic revision to place the government in a position equal to that of
an ordinary citizen when contracting for ordinary commercial purposes.
29. CuRRENT LGAi.

PROBLEMS

71-72 (G. Keeton & G. Schwarzenberger ed. 1968).

30. See PowLns, supra note 27.
31. Manigo v. New York City Housing Auth., 279 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1967).
32. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Conm'n v. McGrath, 341 U.. 123 (1950).
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Even when such standards of administrative propriety are not enforced
m courts, they act as guides to direct the conduct of the vast number of
administrators who are strongly motivated to act justly.
It is conceded that it is too soon to know whether it will be practicable to have a single Ombudsman to cover a given sphere of authority,
whether the context be New Zealand, or the United Kingdom, or an
American state like Hawaii, or the entire Umted States. There would
appear to be too wide an area involved in each of these entities. It should
be remembered, however, that the original Swedish arrangement was a
dual system, and different offices could be designated for different categories or levels of administration. 33 Certainly the office of Ombudsman
will require a great deal of further study and development in the light
of experience. To the ordinary citizen, however, the Ombudsman may
well present a practical prospect of help m achieving administrative
justice and due process in the bureaucratic state.

33. For example, one would expect two of the likeliest areas of citizen complaint
against bureaucracy to be public welfare and police administraton, both of which
are operated by local government to a large degree.

